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Abstract
This article is a research note addressing various theoretical and methodological issues in the
measurement and analysis of religiosity and secularism and their relationship to quantifiable measures
of social health in advanced and prosperous democracies. Particular attention is given to crossnational frameworks for studying religiosity and secularism as well as to the conceptualization and
statistical analysis of these notions for research design. Various procedural suggestions regarding the
use of comparative frameworks are presented to assist in the development and implementation of
future studies gauging the impact of worldview commitments upon societal wellbeing.

Introduction
[1] In a recent article in this journal, Gregory S. Paul undertakes an extensive cross-national study of
the impact of religion and secularism upon democratic polities. Paul’s concern is to test the plausible
and general hypothesis that “radically different worldviews can have measurable impact upon
societal conditions” (¶1). The test case for this hypothesis is whether or not religion and secularism,
broadly construed, have a quantifiable effect upon various measures of societal health such as
criminal victimization, suicide, sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), teen pregnancies and births, and
abortion. Paul notes that while scholarly support exists for the general hypothesis of worldview
effect upon societal health, little to no systematic investigations exist regarding the following test
case hypotheses H1 and, by inference, H2:
H1: “Belief in a creator is beneficial to societies”
H2: “Secularism is beneficial to societies”1
Paul’s study, then, seeks both to remedy this erratum within the academic literature and to initiate
more academic discussion on this important issue.
[2] Paul’s efforts and “first look” should be applauded since they bring to the attention of religious
studies scholars and social scientists a very important and timely subject of study. At the same time,
the scholarly community, in the spirit of constructive and critical scientific inquiry, needs to assess
the methodological assumptions which frame Paul’s investigation. This is especially so given not
only the importance of the subject matter at hand but also Paul’s conclusion that:
The non-religious, pro-evolution democracies contradict the dictum that a society
cannot enjoy good conditions unless most citizens ardently believe in a moral
1

This exact hypothesis is not found anywhere in Paul but is inferred from various comments throughout the article. For
example, in paragraph 19, Paul states “Although they are by no means utopias, the populations of secular democracies
are clearly able to govern themselves and maintain societal cohesion. Indeed, the data examined in this study
demonstrates that only the more secular, pro-evolution democracies have, for the first time in history, come closest to
achieving practical ‘cultures of life’ . . .”
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creator. The widely held fear that a Godless citizenry must experience societal
disaster is therefore refuted. Contradicting these conclusions requires demonstrating a positive
link between theism and societal conditions in the first world with a similarly large body of data – a
doubtful possibility in view of the observable trends (emphasis ours) (¶19).
In what follows, some issues of concern are raised regarding Paul’s important study. It should be
noted that the grounds for this research note are not substantively philosophical. It is not the
concern of this response to address whether or not religiosity and secularity is indeed beneficial or
detrimental to any polity. That would require a far different type and length of a response. Rather,
this rejoinder addresses Paul’s thesis, analysis, and conclusions in terms of the various
methodological assumptions and frameworks used to deploy his study. It is the opinion of the
authors that once all of the methodological issues are considered, Paul’s findings and conclusions are
rendered ineffectual. In closing, various suggestions are offered in the hopes of advancing Paul’s
hopes for “future research and debate on the issue” of comparative analysis of religiosity, secularism,
and democratic social health.
Methodological Individualism
[3] In conducting any research investigation, careful attention must be given to the units of analysis
that are selected as targets of study since these will affect the kinds of generalizations and theorizing
that a researcher is able to articulate and defend. Any unit of analysis carries with it important
characteristics that define and distinguish it from other possible units of analysis which a researcher
may select. In the case at hand, Paul uses individuals and political systems as the primary units of
analysis and applies a loosely defined notion of religion and secularism to each that leads to certain
findings and conclusions. Religion or secularism is inferred to democratic political systems based
upon the self-reports of individuals to survey questions asked by the International Social Survey
Program (ISSP) in 1993 and 1998.2 The methodological assumption inherent in this inference is that
the religiosity or secularity of a political system is reducible to the religiosity or secularity of its
individuals as measured through survey questions. Such analysis leads Paul to commit what social
scientists call the individualistic or reductionist fallacy: the error of making inferences about collectivities
based upon individuals (see the classic essay by Kincaid). This is not to suggest that methodological
individualism in not an aspect of scientific explanations. For example, Paul overlooks the
contributions of theories of individual religious behavior (e.g., Iannaccone; Warner) that can serve as
a micro-level foundation for Paul’s or any other comparative study of religion. But Paul’s sole and
ambiguous use of it injects serious deficiencies within his study.
[4] Moving beyond the religiosity and secularity of individuals, a political system may be a secular
system even if most of its members are committed to a religious worldview and, vice versa, a
political system may be religious even if most of its members are committed to a secular worldview.
This highlights the key dynamic within the unit of analysis problem, namely, that religious or secular
may mean different things at different levels of analysis. The concept of secular, for example, may
denote a political system’s formal structures while when applied to individuals it may denote ethical
orientations or attitudinal outlooks. This leads to the second methodological problem of Paul,
namely, conceptual ambiguity.
2

The International Social Survey Program describes itself as a “a continuing annual programme of cross-national
collaboration on surveys covering topics important for social science research [bringing] together pre-existing social
science projects and coordinat[ing] research goals, thereby adding a cross-national, cross-cultural perspective to the
individual national studies.” See http://www.issp.org/homepage.htm for its history and data archives.
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Conceptual Ambiguity
[5] The effectiveness of any social science research is based upon an isomorphic relationship
between the conceptual-theoretical and the observational-empirical levels. The crucial link in this
relationship is not only the operational definition used to determine and measure the concept in
question but also its degree of congruence with the concept. In studies of religion and secularism,
researchers should bear in mind that “defining religion is a slippery enterprise” given the fact that
“the broad panoply of what are often seen as religious movements” makes it difficult to construct “a
single definition that encompasses all these entities” (Gill: 120). The study presented in Paul’s essay
suffers both from a serious lack of conceptual and operational clarity as it regards religiosity and
secularism rendering both the methods and findings at best unclear and at worse highly invalid.
Nowhere in Paul’s essay does one encounter clear and succinct definitions of either of the concepts
in question. If one considers the concept of secularism, for example, Paul does not consider the
important contributions of Casanova, Lechner, or Berger (1967, 1997). All of these scholars
advanced complex theories of secularization that would assist any study seeking to understand or
predict trends and relationships between secularity and societal health. As Table One suggests (see
below), Paul’s study is replete with loosely analogous terms that are assumed to be isomorphic to the
concepts of religiosity and secularism. Even a casual survey of these terms reveals that such an
assumption, as well as the inference that the terms are similar amongst themselves, is completely
invalid.
[6] Paul’s methodological individualism, as suggested earlier, also leads him to overlook appropriate
institutional definitions for religiosity and secularism. For example, in defining secular polities one
must take into account whether or not some institutional religion or its premises control its legal and
judicial processes as well as whether or not such polities favor any religion. Such characteristics may
lead to basic distinctions between states that are religious (e.g., Iran), states that favor one particular
religion (e.g., Greece), states that are secular (e.g., United States), and states that are anti-religious
(e.g., China). In the case of the United States, its legal and judicial processes are not governed by any
institutional religious sect or premises and it itself does not officially favor any religion. As such, the
United States is a secular nation not a religious or theistic nation.3 Nowhere in Paul’s study does one
find any treatment regarding institutional religiosity or secularity. The next concern, to which this
essay now turns, regards the assumptions of comparative correlations among the findings of the
ISSP.

3

On this point see Taylor, who makes a distinction between a secularism that is religiously based and one that does not
depend upon any religious commitment. He identifies American secularism as being founded upon a nondenominational Protestantism that has now begun to fracture leaving American secularism without any religious
foundation. This type of religiously founded secularism is different than, for example, the more assertive secularism of
France where its existence does not rely on any religious premises but rather on its worldview status. For an excellent
discussion of these types of secularism, see McClay.
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Table One: Theoretical Concepts and Ambiguous Conceptual Definitions
Theoretical Concept: RELIGIOSITY

Theoretical Concept: SECULARISM

Popular belief in a creator, supernatural
Extensive secularization, secularization,
creator, absolute belief in God, faith in
secularism, western secular materialism,
creator, creator belief, belief in and worship
secular, secular cultures
of creator
Theists, theism, theistic, pro-theistic,
conservative theists, cultural and moral
superiority of theism

Religious recession, non-religious, low
religiosity, less religious

Anti-evolution creationism, creationism,
creationist, purposive creation, purpose
and design

Acceptance of evolution, theory of
biological evolution, evolutionary
science, evolution, popular acceptance
of human evolution, pro-evolution

Evangelical Christian

Denial of a creator, disbelief of a
creator, popular disbelief in God

Obedience to strict moral dictates

Widespread abandonment of faith

Judeo-Christian worldview

Avowed atheists

Faith based charities

Less theistic, non-theism

Religion, religious belief and practice,
religious affiliation, religious values,
religious moralist, religiosity, popular
religiosity, religiosity (in terms of ardency,
conservatism, and activities), attendance of
religious services, prayer rates, worship,
prayer, and other aspects of religious
practice

Little in the way of religious values or
institutions

Bible literalism
Comparative Analysis and Operationalizations
[7] In terms of scientific and methodological rigor, the ISSP studies are considered as some of the
most sophisticated and successful cross-national social surveys. Yet as any social scientist is well
aware, survey research and the use of secondary data are plagued with methodological quandaries
that have the potential of rendering any study worthless (on the problems of survey research and
secondary data analysis, see Converse and Presser; Kiecolt and Nathan; Rossi, Wright, and
Anderson; Turner and Martin). These predicaments are magnified when studies, like the ISSP, are of
a cross-national or comparative nature. The problems of producing cross-national comparison based
on tailor-made cross-national surveys are well documented in the literature. Madden suggests that
cultural analysts are too often sloppy when utilizing comparative cultural statistics, particularly when
they produce and present data. Atkinson and Brandolini offer an extensive catalogue of the
problems that arise in cross-country comparisons and time-series analysis of economic data since
these are extremely sensitive to data selection and categorization as well as definitions of categories
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4

8 (2006)

of analysis. Shaw, Dijk, and Rhomberg, in their study of trends in global crime and criminal justice,
conclude that it is methodologically hazardous to engage in any cross-country comparative study of
crime statistics. For Shaw et al., the cross-country crime comparisons suffer from indelible
definitional, reporting, and database deficiencies rooted in comparative cultural and structural
differences. These and other findings lead Shaw et al. to employ comparative data on crime and
justice admitting that such use takes into account that “the conclusions that can be drawn from the
survey data, unless detailed analysis on a country-per-country basis is carried out, must be
considered as high-level overview of trends” (36).
[8] While all of these studies and many others should prohibit the casual and non-rigorous analysis
and application of comparative studies and secondary data sets, none specifically address the studies
conducted under the auspices of the ISSP. Can these cautionary exhortations also apply to the
various surveys of the ISSP? In a well-documented and extensive analysis of the ISSP, Jowell offers
perhaps the most serious treatment of the problems and pitfall of cross-national studies using ISSP
as a “useful case study” (170). In general, Jowell would be in agreement with applying the findings of
Madden, Atkinson and Brandolini, and Shaw et al. to ISSP surveys and findings. And in spite of the
ISSP’s reputation for sophistication and rigor, Jowell finds that it suffers from serious debilitations
due to “cultural and methodological divides” (170). One may ask just what debilities Jowell has in
mind. Consider the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

No recognizable probability sampling by some ISSP member countries
Varying standards for selections of ISSP survey respondents
Non-equivalent functional translations of survey words and phrases
Varying fieldwork periods in ISSP member countries

While all of the above seriously undermine the validity and reliability of ISSP surveys and any
conclusions that researchers may want to draw from them, the most destructive limitation is the
translation equivalency problem. As some scholars note, the task of creating surveys and studies that
are clear and straightforward is predicated on using “simple language, common concepts,
manageable tasks, and widespread information” (Converse and Presser: 10). These comments were
made regarding the formulation of English language surveys for English-speaking respondents. Imagine
the colossal profundity of crafting an English language survey of such complex concepts as religion,
belief in God, nature, evolution, etc. and then translating this survey instrument into other languages
with the goal of conveying the same understanding and meaning the English-speaking survey
researchers assumed in the first place! This task is nothing short of monumental.
[9] As a case in point, Jowell asks readers to consider the “insuperable” difficulties that the ISSP
encountered in its 1991 module on religion. Jowell writes:
Consider even the answer categories employed in British English questionnaires. Are
there comfortable and familiar functional equivalents in, say, Polish, Hungarian,
Bengali, or Japanese of the phrases slightly agree and slightly disagree, or just a bit? When
the ISSP was in the throes of designing its 1991 module on religion, the Japanese
delegation eventually came to the reluctant conclusion that there was no appropriate
word or phrase in Japanese that approximated the concept of God. In the end, of
course, they managed to come up with a doubtless somewhat tortuous
circumlocution designed to get across the basic meaning of the Judeo-ChristianIslamic concept of God. But beware of data that depend on such contrivances based
on collegiality! (172).
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Beyond this example, Jowell presents other serious translation problems that plagued the ISSP
efforts in the 1990’s. These and other deficiencies led Jowell to argue that while researchers ought
not to abandon cross-national studies, their analysis should:
. . . be rather more circumspect than it sometimes is. It would be unwise, to say the
least, to draw heroic conclusions on the basis of unexpected national variations in
the answers to a single question. But, recalling the difficulty of asking questions
about God in Japan, it is frankly unwise to draw firm conclusions about any large
national variations in data in the absence of sound local knowledge of the countries
concerned- relating not only to the methods employed and possible ambiguities in
concepts or questions but also to the society’s social structure and history (173).
Beyond methodological critique, Jowell offers a list of 10 “rules of thumb” for addressing the
various problems that beleaguer comparative studies to ensure their responsible application. Given
the case at hand, a few are noteworthy and bear repeating in an abbreviated format:
Rule 1:

Social scientists should undertake not to interpret survey data relating to a country
about which they know little or nothing.

Rule 2:

Analysts of cross-national data should resist the temptation to compare too many
countries at once.

Rule 3:

Cross-national surveys should pay as much attention to the choice and compilation of
aggregate-level contextual variables as they do to individual-level dependent and
independent variables.

Rule 4:

Social scientists contemplating or engaged in cross-national studies should be as open
about their limitations as they are enthusiastic about their explanatory powers.

Rule 5:

Analysts of cross-national data should undertake to suspend belief initially in any
major intercountry differences they discover.

Given Jowell’s precautions, it would be prudent to consider just what it is that one can learn from
Paul’s study on religiosity, secularism, and social health.
Real versus Artifactual Differences: A Note of Caution
[10] One of the most alarming claims that Jowell advances is the possibility that national differences
arising from ISSP data may be nothing more than fictional:
Difficult as it is for a native British English speaker to judge, it is hard to resist
wondering whether some of the national differences that emerge from ISSP data are
in reality merely artifacts of doubtful translations, where the translated word or
phrase has acted as a slightly different stimulus from the one intended. To the extent
that this happens, some fascinating cross-national differences that emerge may be
partially (or wholly) illusory (172).4
Jowell alludes not only to response errors (e.g., communication errors) but, as mentioned earlier, to
sampling errors. Both types of errors are what can be termed measurement errors and lead one to
question not only the validity and reliability of Paul’s methods and findings but also the legitimacy of
4

Jowell also writes that “the demands of good science require us not to turn a blind eye to such imperfections when we
come to interpreting the data arising from these studies nor to accept at face value differences between nations that we
know may well be illusory and artifactual” (169).
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his conclusions. If Jowell is correct and if Paul’s study falls prey to methodological individualism and
sloppy conceptualizations, then the differences between religious and secular nations are a result of
measurement errors (e.g., poor sampling, translation non-equivalence, etc.) and therefore do not
reflect real differences between prosperous democracies.
[11] Having said this, one of the difficulties inherent in Paul’s study is the lack of clear and distinct
hypotheses. This multiplicity of hypotheses is an inherent problem particularly in the study of
religion. As Gill reminds us:
As with most academic fads concerning dramatic, global phenomena, research on
religious fundamentalism tends to produce studies emphasizing “big” processes with
very little microlevel foundational basis. The broad concepts employed present
problems in developing testable hypotheses (119).
Earlier in the essay, it was suggested that perhaps the chief hypotheses being tested in Paul’s
investigation were:
H1: “Belief in a creator is beneficial to societies”
H2: “Secularism is beneficial to societies”
But Paul advances other hypotheses that he appears to consider as identical to these. Consider for
example the following:
H3: Popular religiosity is societally advantageous
H4: High rates of belief in a creator, as well as worship, prayer and other aspects of
religious practice, correlate with lowering rates of lethal violence, suicide, nonmonogamous sexual activity, and abortion, as well as improved physical health.
H5: Faith-based, virtuous “cultures of life” are attainable if people believe that God
created them for a special purpose and follow the strict moral dictates imposed by
religion.
H6: Faith in a creator improves societal conditions
H7: Faith in a creator degrades societal conditions
H8: Disbelief in evolution improves societal conditions
H9: Disbelief in evolution degrades societal conditions
H10: U.S. is a “shining city on the hill” to the rest of the world
When one adds this plethora of hypotheses along with Paul’s conceptual superfluity, it is impossible
to know what in fact is being measured, tested or falsified. This lack of measuring clarity and
falsification not only causes Paul to violate the scientific principles of corrigibility and
incrementalism but allows Paul to engage in theoretical though meaningless comparisons of nations
based on simple scatter plots and outlying data.
[12] As one considers Paul’s study, much caution and skepticism should be applied to such
statements as the following (all emphases not in original):
1. “The view of the U.S. as a ‘shining city on the hill’ to the rest of the world is falsified” (¶18).
2. “Levels of religious and nonreligious belief and practice, and indicators of societal health and
dysfunction, have been most extensively and reliably surveyed in the prosperous developed
democracies” (¶9).
Journal of Religion & Society
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3. “Self-reported rates of religious attendance and practice may be significantly higher than
actual rates, but the data is useful for relative comparisons . . .” (¶10).
4. “. . . the relatively reliable nature of the data” (¶11).
5. “. . . correlations of raw data” (¶12), or “The primary intent is to present basic correlations of the
elemental data” (¶2).
6. “. . . higher rates of religious affiliation, attendance, and prayer do not result in lower juvenileadult mortality rates on a cross-national basis” (¶15).
7. “Claims that secular cultures aggravate abortion rates are therefore contradicted by the
quantitative data” (¶16).
8. “In other cases, the correlations are strongly graded, sometimes outstandingly so” (¶18).
9. “Indeed, the data examined in this study demonstrates that only . . .” (¶19).
10. “Contradicting these conclusions requires demonstrating a positive link between theism and
societal conditions . . .” (¶19).
All of these statements violate most if not all of the rules for comparative data analysis established
by Jowell and Madden.
[13] Even if one sets aside the above methodological difficulties that frame Paul’s study, his
execution of the analysis leaves much to be desired. As noted earlier, Paul states his findings in
strong language, but throughout his analysis, he handles his data with uncharacteristic modesty. In
truth, there his analysis has much to be modest about.
[14] To support his findings, Paul marshals a series of scatterplots as evidence. These plots belie the
bivariate nature of his analysis. If any investigation demands a multivariate approach, it is one in
which staggering claims are made. In order to examine and then eliminate rival hypotheses, Paul
must utilize a technique that controls for other relevant variables of interest. For example, it is
possible that crime rates are as much a function of the degree of political freedom in a society as
they are a function of the theistic bent of the culture or the individuals in that culture. In order to
dismiss such a suggestion, Paul must attempt to control for the degree of freedom present in First
World Democratic Polities. Since he does not, we are forced to treat his results as spurious, for there
is a great possibility that all of his bivariate relationships are illusory, with his dependent variables
more likely influenced by the array of independent variables he does not examine.
[15] Even if the bivariate approach is justified in some comparative studies, the method of reporting
those results is standardized among social scientists. Paul does not provide the reader with a
meaningful opportunity to evaluate his findings, for he provides no correlation coefficients. He also
fails to determine or report the significance of these correlations, so the reader is left to trust Paul’s
judgment that a negative correlation between theism and indicators of societal health has been
established.5 Statistics exist so that we are not required to trust the subjective judgment alone,
particularly in regard to matters as weighty as theism, democracy, and the social good.
Conclusion
[16] As mentioned earlier, Paul’s investigation should be applauded for bringing to the attention of
scholars an important and neglected problem- the relationship between worldview commitments
and societal health. Paul’s work brings to the fore the importance of various beliefs for the
prosperity of democratic polities. At the same time, however, its methodological problems do not
allow for any conclusive statement to be advanced regarding the various hypotheses Paul seeks to
5

This may lead Paul to commit the Fallacy of Presumptive Proof. On this issue, see Fisher.
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demonstrate or falsify. What one can state with certainty is that one cannot in any way be certain as to the
effects of religiosity and secularism upon prosperous democracies at least as based upon the methods and data of
Paul’s study.
[17] In order to make incremental progress in demonstrating or falsifying any relationship between
religiosity and secularism and societal health, one would have at least to address the following issues:
1. Conceptual clarity and consistency of use regarding the terms “religiosity” and “secularism.”
2. Clear, distinct, and falsifiable hypotheses.
3. Explicit and adequate implementation of comparative analysis suggestions as found in Jowell
and Madden.
4. Clear presentation of statistical tests.
5. Adequate discussion of the role of individual and formal political structures as these relate to
the concepts in question.
6. Adequate assessment of the relationship between individual attitudes and behaviors and the
relationship of these to macro-societal characteristics.
It is acknowledged that other important issues besides these should be addressed (e.g., the
contribution of various societal structures [e.g., police enforcement, diet, attitudes toward sexuality]
to societal health). Yet one can be certain that any future examination in this important topic that
implements these “rules of thumb” will be on a more sure footing and will make a contribution to
our understanding of the role of worldview commitments to social health by avoiding the
methodological pitfalls that can damage even the most noble of efforts.
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